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Abstract: 
Jagatsinghpur, a district in the eastern Indian state of Odisha, has attracted media attention for 
a lengthy fight over land between a community of betel-farmers, fisher folk and livestock 
herders on one side, and the state and state patronized corporations seeking to build a steel 
plant, port and captive power plant on the other. The struggle has lasted over a decade amidst 
reports of killings, arrests and gross human rights violations. In 2017, after 12 years, Korean 
steel giantPOSCO withdrew, only to be replaced by Indian corporations seeking the same 
land. In this chapter, we examine the anti-POSCO People’s Movement (POSCO Pratirodh 
Sangram Samiti) as an example of post-development in practice. The movement’s anti-
corporate stance, and its defence of a sustainable and dignified land-based livelihood and the 
right to self-governance align with key tenets of post-development. However, in other areas 
the movement’s stance is more aligned with a traditional development paradigm, including 
desire for markets for petty commodities, and belief in the state as the inevitable, appropriate 
site of self-governance, and an agent of development. We conclude that to work towards a 
pluriverse, we must attend to aspirations that entail tensions between post-development and 
more traditional development principles. 
 
Introduction 
In the district of Jagatsinghpur, in the eastern Indian state of Odisha, a community of betel-
farmers, fisherfolk and livestock herders spent more than a decade in a protracted struggle 
against South Korean steel giant POSCO to retain their coastal farming, grazing lands, 
waterbodies and other environmental resources that are shared in common and used for 
livelihoods. In 2017, POSCO finally withdrew, and the community has enjoyed a temporary 
reprieve from forced land acquisition threats, though rumours are rife that other companies 
are interested in the land. The communities believe that their struggle is not over.  
 
In this chapter, we examine the anti-POSCO People’s Movement (POSCO Pratirodh 
Sangram Samiti, PPSS) as an example of post-development in practice. The movement’s 
anti-corporate stance, its defence of its members’ common and private land and resources, its 
resistance to a forcible transition to wage labour and exclusion from land-based sustainable 
livelihoods, its concern for the environment, and its insistence on members’ rights to 
determine their own futures, all align with key tenets of post-development. Because the 
movement has developed as inherently oppositional, and is situated within a highly polarised 
political economy of development in Odisha, it is easy and indeed tempting to understand the 
movement as almost quintessentially post-development. However, upon closer inspection, 
there are a number of axes on which the movement’s stance is more aligned with some quite 
traditional (pre-neoliberal) ideas around development, including the importance of access to 
markets for petty commodities, and a strong belief in the state as both the inevitable and 
appropriate site of self-governance, and an agent of development (in this case through the 
provision of infrastructure for petty commodity production and trade). We offer this actually 
existing practice, then, as an example of how an exceptionally resilient community has 
resisted unwanted development, while also engaging in and negotiating not only post-
development principles, but also development ones, generating its own vision of the future 
and the good life that rejects globalised and heavily industrialised capitalism; but seeks 
engagement with and benefit from local small-scale industrialised capitalist trade and the 
state. In general, villagers have not displaced development as the set of discourses and 
practices through which living conditions are understood (Escboar2012,pp.xii-xiii), but rather 
they imagine a development alternative (not an alternative to development). As Corbridge 
(1998, p.139) notes, opting out of development is not the only option. 
 
In this chapter we draw on publicly available documents and qualitative research with PPSS 
leaders. We draw on research we have conducted independently and together since Sandeep 
began working with the movement in 2009, and Sam began researching the POSCO case in 
2011. This includes knowledge Sandeep has gleaned as a solidarity activist working on 
displacement and the rights of scheduled tribes and castes, and documenting the movement’s 
work (Pattnaik 2011) and knowledge Sam has gained researching the movement’s efforts to 
oust POSCO (Balaton-Chrimes 2016; Balaton-Chrimes& Haines 2016). In addition, we also 
draw on recent interviews (five with PPSS members, two with PPSS leaders) conducted by 
Sandeep in April 2018, a time in which the movement was regrouping after POSCO’s 
withdrawal a little over a year earlier, strategizing about possible future threats of land 
acquisition, and reflecting on how to reconfigure its goals in light of POSCO’s exit. 
 
We are exploring here the movement’s ideas of what it is to live well, their formulation of the 
good life. At this point, a few methodological caveats are in order. In speaking of ‘the 
movement’s’ view of the good life, we are not suggesting this is a singular vision. The 
villagers who are members of the movement include different people with different skills and 
livelihoods, and different property rights, and these differences (among others) generate 
variation in people’s desires. We consider this normal and attend to the variation in our 
analysis. We also wish to be clear that, when we deal with recent interview material, this 
picture of villagers’ aspirations is a snapshot of a particular point in time, albeit situated 
against the lengthy backdrop of opposition to globalised and industrialised capitalist 
expansion. We are not suggesting this snapshot captures a fixed set of desires, nor that it 
covers everything members of the movement might want now or in the future. We labour this 
point in order to ward against a common criticism made of post-development, namely that it 
romanticises and essentialises social movements (Ziai 2017, pp.2547-8). We wish to do 
neither, but rather to keep open space for internal diversity and changes over time in how 
these communities conceptualise what it is to live well. Finally, our research has been 
conducted only with members of the movement, and so does not take into account the desires 
of villagers who were pro-POSCO because they expected (unrealistically high levels of) 
compensation and benefitsfrom the project (Balaton-Chrimes 2016, p.21). These pro-POSCO 
villagers have formed the United Action Committee, consisting of around 1000 members, 
demanding a compensation package for loss of betel vines, prawn gheries and cultivable land 
at the proposed project site.We exclude these people from our research not to invalidate their 
development aspirations, but because of the focus of this edited volume on post-development 
in practice.  
 
We focus here on PPSS in order to contribute to the growing post-development literature that 
is rich in empirical detail, and therefore much greater nuance than the early work on post-
development (Escobar 2012, p.xv-xvi). We are not suggesting our analysis of PPSS can be 
generalised to all people’s movements, or even all anti-displacement or anti-corporate 
people’s movements in India. Rather, this snapshot is intended to be generative of insights 
about the interplay between development and post-development principles and aspirations 
(Hage 2016). It is, in de Sousa Santos’ (2014, p.ix, p.44) terms, ‘rearguard theory’, anchored 
in an empirical account of the movement that seeks to know with, understand, facilitate and 
share, rather than acting as a theoretical vanguard that claims to know about, explain and 
guide.  
 
In what follows, we outline the history of the movement in the context of Odisha, where a 
very traditional modernist development project is being vigorously pursued by the state 
government. We go on to explore two areas in which there is tension between development 
and post-development sensibilities: the role of the state in self-governance, and a 
commitment to state-supported small-scale light industrial capitalist production and trade. We 
conclude by arguing that if we are committed to building a pluriverse, then we need to attend 
to aspirations that entail tensions between post-development and more traditional 
development principles.   
 
Oppositional development politics  
The political economy of Odisha is one that heavily privileges a modernist imaginary of 
development as occurring through economic growth, fuelled by industrialisation(especially 
private sector), and is hostile to alternative understandings of development or ways of life. 
Until the 1980s, Odisha’s economy was predominantly agricultural, with some light 
manufacturing (Adduci 2012). Where there were industrial developments, such as the state-
owned Rourkela steel plant, NALCO Aluminium or the Hirakud dam, these were designed to 
meet the needs of the state for energy or broader India for the expansion of its industrial base, 
but they did little to contribute to the state’s economic growth (Adduci 2012). Beginning as 
early as the 1980s and accelerating under the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) government withNaveen 
Patnaikas Chief Minister since 1997, the state government has sought to reorient the 
economy towards industrialization.i The state government sees industrialization, particularly 
through mining of the state’s abundant mineral resources (Department of Steel & Mines 
2015) and value-adding processes (such as steel manufacturing) as the key to generating 
employment (Adduci 2012, p.78). In order to exploit these natural resources, the state has 
sought to out-compete other states to attract private, including foreign, capital and 
concentrated its efforts in the iron ore and steel sectors.ii A progressively established policy 
framework seeks to facilitate this investment through committing to deregulation, with a 
focus on the mineral sector, and orienting the government’s role to the establishment of 
infrastructure through public–private partnerships (via the Odisha Industrial Policy 2001, 
Industries Facilitation Act 2004 and Industrial Policy 2007, Policy for Special Economic 
Zone 2015),  providing special security for industrial projects through the Odisha Industrial 
Security Forces Act (2012), and the establishment of the country’s first Single Window 
Clearance mechanism (following the Odisha Industries (Facilitation) Act 2004) to speed up 
clearances and approvals (Odisha State Government 2018). The government has been 
particularly proactive in providing support for land acquisition through the Industrial 
Infrastructure Development Corporation (IDCO) of Odisha, which is a state nodal agency for 
land acquisition. The IDCO has already reserved at least 59,000 acres under a land bank 
project for industrial infrastructure, partly in response to POSCO’s withdrawal over 
difficulties in land acquisition(Times of India 2017). 
 
The shift in state economic policy towards industrialization and liberalization has led to high 
economic growth rates, an estimated 7.14% for 2017-2018, surpassing the national growth 
rate of 6.5% (New Indian Express 2018). Poverty has also decreased significantly in the state, 
from 57.2% in 2004–05 (60.8% in rural areas and 37.6% in urban areas) to 32.59% in 2011–
12 (35.69% in rural areas and 17.29% in urban areas). Nevertheless, Odisha remains one of 
the poorest states in India (where national poverty rates had dropped to 21.92% in 2011–
12(Planning Commission 2014, pp.28-29) and poverty is particularly concentrated among the 
state’s large population of vulnerable populations, where poverty rates are at 63.52% for 
Scheduled Tribes and 41.39% for Scheduled Castes in 2011–12 (Planning and Coordination 
Department 2014, p.271).  
 
Conventional critics of the state’s development model have not departed from a modernist 
imaginary of development, but rather focus on problems with its implementation. Some have 
argued that increases in mining and industry have not had the anticipated effect of also 
increasing production and employment in downstream sectors such as manufacturing 
(Adduci 2012, pp.86-88). Others argue that the failure of mining-led industrialization to bring 
benefit to all the people of Odisha is, in part, the result of the government’s failure to 
adequately regulate the industry to ensure that private investments adhere to the rule of law 
and make adequate assessments of the costs and benefits of private (or public) industrial 
projects (Maringanti et al 2013, p.71). Some on the Indian left attribute this ‘growth without 
inclusion’ to the parallel neglect of agriculture (Panda 2008; Mishra2010). The agricultural 
sector provides more employment than the industrial sector, yet the state government has 
allowed the sector to stagnate through lack of investment, as well as slow but steady 
dispossession of agricultural land and other forms of common property, such as forests and 
water resources, that traditional agriculturalists use in farming (Mishra 2011).  
 
Both the state’s development model and the most common criticisms of it subscribe to what 
Ziai (2013:126-127) identifies as the core assumptions of development that post-
developmentalists are concerned about: The existential assumption that there is such a thing 
as development, the normative assumption that development is a good thing, the practical 
assumption that development can be achieved, and the methodological assumption that units 
(states) can be compared according to their development.iiiFurthermore, both the state’s 
model and its main critics also share in three additional assumptions Ziai identifies as 
associated with the classical paradigm of development: that the goal is to be industrialised 
like the countries of North America and Europe; that this is to be achieved through economic 
growth, industrialisation and modernisation; and that such interventions can be readily 
legitimated by basing them on expert knowledge.iv 
 
Though academic criticism has largely shared in these assumptions and sought to better 
implement programs of industrialisation and growth, a number of anti-corporate and anti-
displacement people’s movements have mounted more fundamental challenges to this model. 
These movements have questioned the extreme social, economic and environmental costs 
that ordinary people face when displaced for large-scale industrial projects. They typically 
seek to stop major industrial projects, but sometimes seek to negotiate better terms for benefit 
sharing, usually in cases where there is no realistic hope of retaining their land (Dash and 
Samal 2008). By rejecting industrialisation and global capitalism as development 
mechanisms, these people’s movements demonstrate some post-development leanings. 
Between 2005, when the state government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
POSCO, and 2017 when the company pulled out, PPSS was one of the most resilient and 
successful of these.  
 
The proposed POSCO project was a US$12 billion investment – the biggest foreign direct 
investment ever in India – that would have included construction of an integrated steel plant, 
mine and associated infrastructure. It had unprecedented levels of support from the state 
government of Odisha, as well as the Union government of India, and the South Korean 
government, and the MoU offered particularly generous terms for POSCO with respect to 
access to land and minerals, taxes and support for clearing regulatory hurdles (Balaton-
Chrimes 2016, pp.14-15). The most controversy was around the proposed plant site of 4004 
acres, covering 8 villages in the three gram panchayats of Dhinkia, Gobindapur and 
Gadakujanga, and a total population of 22 000 people (Pingle et al., 2010, p.52; IHRC and 
ESCR-Net, 2013, p.12; Asher, 2009:11; MZPSG, 2010: 6).A total of 718 families would 
have been displaced (Balaton-Chrimes 2016, p.14). The compensation package offered by 
POSCO was inadequate to protect against impoverishment, there was inadequate consultation 
around the project and its impacts, and there were high levels of government sponsored 
violence, intimidation and harassment against PPSS members (Balaton-Chrimes 2016; IHRC 
and ESCR-net 2013). Supporters helped the movement with legal and regulatory appeals, 
national and transnational campaigning, and a complaint to the OECD National Contact Point 
(Balaton-Chrimes 2016), but the most decisive factor in making the project untenable for 
POSCO was the resistance of the people’s movement. 
 
Formed within weeks of the signing of the POSCO MoU, PPSS claims to represent 80% of 
the people in the areas affected by the proposed POSCO steel plant in Jagatsinghpur, with 
Dhinkia panchayat the movement’s consistent stronghold (Ceresna, 2011, p.20). The 
movements’ objective was to prevent the POSCO project from going ahead;to retain their 
ancestral lands and livelihoods; and to protect the local environment. Its strategy to achieve 
these objectives has been two-fold: non-violent direct action, and a policy of non-engagement 
with the company or government on anything other than protection of their land and 
environmental rights. The movement is structured through village committees, an inter-
village general council of 50 to 150 members (it changes over time), an executive committee 
consisting of 51 members, 40% of whom are women,and a smaller core leadership group of 
approximately 10 people responsible for urgent decisions, led by the movement’s chairman, 
Abhay Sahoo, who is a member of the Communist Party of India (CPI) (Pattnaik, 2011, p.54; 
Interview with Prasant Paikray, spokesperson PPSS, Bhubaneshwar, December 2012; 
Interview with Abhay Sahoo, leader PPSS, Jagatsinghpur, December 2013). Members of 
PPSS make small financial contributions to the movement to sustain its activities, and 
participate in non-violent direct-action protests. Day to day, members of the movement 
provide mutual support, for example through resolving conflict to avoid having to deal with 
the police, or through working on collective projects such as unblocking waterways, or 
preparing for cyclones (Pattnaik, 2011, p.58; Interview with Prasant Paikray, spokesperson 
PPSS, Bhubaneshwar, December 2012). PPSS thus functions both as a resistance movement 
and a self-help movement that filled the gap left by a state they saw as promoting POSCO’s 
interests over that of its citizens. PPSS liaises with more formal organisations, such as civil 
society organisations, legal activists or journalists, academics, anti- displacement movements, 
political parties, and national and international solidaritycommittees to take advantage of 
their technical expertise and networks. Other organisations can make their own decisions 
regarding their strategies and tactics, which, by engaging the law and other more formal 
channels, are complementary to non-violent direct action and non-engagement. However, 
PPSS operates on the principle of solidarity, constituted by a strict policy of non-interference 
from outside organisations in PPSS’s internal matters (Interview with Prasant Paikray, 
Spokesperson PPSS, Bhubaneshwar, December 2012). Though POSCO has quit the project, 
the issue of land already acquired and transferred to POSCO still remains. Odisha’s Industry 
minister has told the state assembly the land will be kept in a land bank and plans are being 
made to fence the land.Since POSCO’s withdrawal, PPSS has called on the government to 
return the land, and has mobilised people to repossess their farm lands and reconstruct their 
vineyards for the cultivation of betel leaves. 
 
As an ‘anti’ movement, PPSS’s goals have been defined primarily in oppositional terms – 
what they are against, rather than what they are for. The initial formation of the movement 
was facilitated by Ghandian activists who had a presence in the area as part of a humanitarian 
effort after the 1999 super cyclone, and who shared the early information about the project 
and its impacts with the villagers. Their non-violent approach, even in the face of attacks 
from pro-POSCO villagers, attracted many new members to the movement. They organised 
mass dharanas (sit-ins) outside government offices, and had roving satyagrahis (proponents 
of non-violence) raising awareness throughout the villages (Pattnaik 2011, p.55). A few 
months later, opposition political parties, particularly CPI, began touring the area and also 
became involved in the movement (Pattnaik 2011, p.56), quickly forming a leadership group. 
The movement therefore has its ideological origins both in Ghandian notions of swaraj (self-
rule) and in leftist opposition to (particularly global) capitalism.vHowever, neither of these 
ideological orientations has firmly shaped the aspirations of the villagers, who instead hold a 
less ideologically developed commitment simply to a source of livelihood that is both 
adequate and sustainable over the long term, and which is often (but not always) deemed by 
villagers to include guaranteed access to communal resources. 
 
Development and post-development 
PPSS’ emphasis on political self-governance (particularly through the activities of the gram 
sabhas(Village Councils), economic self-determination and ecological preservation in many 
ways aligns neatly with a post-development sensibility. The movement does not trust that the 
state’ modernist development will deliver on its promise of improved quality of life (Sachs 
2010, p.xii). It is critical of disvaluing of non-industrial and non-economised ways of life, 
and of the violence and domination that takes place in the name of the expansion of 
capitalism and a westernised way of life(Ziai 2015, p. 840-842; Ziai 2017, p.2457-8). More 
specifically, the movement objects to the enclosure of the commons, the associated 
transformation of farmers or fisherfolk into (surplus) wage labourers, and the risks this poses 
to their very survival, and adopts civil disobedience as a strategy to combat these risks(Shiva 
2005). However, looking more closely, villagers’ aspirations – as opposed to their rejections 
– reveal a more complex engagement with some of the core tenets of post-development 
scholarship.  
 
The state and self-governance 
The post-development literature, in its earliest iterations, held a stance of suspicion toward 
the state. Esteva and Prakash’s (2014, p.13)idealised post-modern grassroots movements, for 
example,were “independent from and antagonistic to the state and its formal and corporative 
structures.” More recent scholarship both within and critical of post-developmenthas rightly 
corrected this hostile stance to ask more nuanced questions about the role of the state in what 
this volume is calling post-development in practice. Following Corbridge’s call for field 
research that reveals the everyday experiences of state (and market) (Corbridge 2010, p.87; 
see also Corbridge et al 2005), we agree that attention to actually existing practices of state-
citizen relations is more useful for understanding and advancing the aspirations of people in 
the South. In the case of India, Vandana Shiva (2005, p.35) characterises the state as having 
an ambivalent role in a ‘zone of contest in conflicts between enclosures and reclamation of 
the commons’. While the state can sometimes be ‘inverted’, more committed to foreign 
investment than its citizens’ wellbeing (Shiva 2005, pp.77-78), it is also the case that some 
post-development arguments are problematic insofar as they call for a weakening of states 
that can expose communities to the vagaries and violence of global capitalism (McGregor 
2009, p.1696). PPSS’s struggle is situated within precisely this predicament: the actually 
existing state is more committed to foreign capital than citizen welfare, but if not the state, 
then who will protect the villagers from that very same capital? 
 
PPSS has been continuously and keenly alive to the dilemma this poses. One of the 
movement’s most central and consistent strategies has thus been to advocate for proper 
implementation of citizen rights to self-governance outlined in Indian legislation via the 
PanchayatiRaj (rule by village councils) system. The 73rd amendment of the Indian 
Constitution recognises the Panchayats as self-governing units at the district and sub-district 
levels, and as the main locus of democratic decentralization.viIn 2006, a further important 
piece of legislation, the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition 
of Forest Rights) Act, commonly known simply as the Forest Rights Act (FRA) came into 
force. This Act proposes to set right the historical injustices done to those living in and 
around forests.In order to protect their existing livelihoods and way of life, people in the 
villages affected by the proposed POSCO project applied – without success - for recognition 
of their status as Other traditional Forest Dwellers (Balaton-Chrimes 2016, p.17). This is a 
category afforded special land rights under FRA, namely (in section ii, 3a) the “right to hold 
and live in the forest land under the individual or common occupation for habitation or for 
self cultivation for livelihood.” In short, Indian law provides for considerable decision-
making autonomy for PPSS members, and one of the movement’s primary objectives is to 
activate these laws. 
 
Since the signing of the POSCO MoU in 2005,Gram Sabha resolutions rejecting the POSCO 
project were passed in all three Gram Panchayats, though these have been ignored by the 
state government (Balaton-Chrimes 2016, p.18).These resolutions demonstrate how the 
movement has utilised a robust collective decision takingprocess and a strong sense of 
camaraderie among themselves to combat the state’s efforts to avoid its responsibilities and 
forcibly displace them, of which they are keenly aware.  
 
This strategy reflects the movement’s commitment to strengthen existing mechanisms of self-
governance. We deliberately use the term self-governance here, rather than self-
determination, because the implication is not that the movement’s members seek some form 
of independence from the state, either in the sense of separatism or in the sense of a lack of 
dependence.vii On the contrary, the movement sees the state as having responsibilities to 
respect and fulfil the aspirations of villagers. This does not necessarily mean the claim is not 
a radical one, however – it is quite radical insofar as it calls on the state for resources and 
investment, but in a way that is entirely deferent to local decision-making processes. The 
relationship the movement is trying to establish, then, is one of mutual interdependence 
between people and the state. The effort is to move from the current state hostility, toward a 
situation in which the state is theirs.  
 The state, small-scale industrialised capitalism and wage labour 
Perhaps even more so than the state, the post-development literature has a very hostile 
attitude toward markets. Ziai (2017, p. 2458) identifies one of the core tenets of post-
development as conceptualising development as an economic rationality centred around 
accumulation, and possessing a capitalist logic of privileging activities earning money 
through the market. Esteva (2010, p.17) claims that ‘disengaging form the economic logic of 
the market or the plan has become the very condition for survival’. Shiva (2010, p. 238) is 
also critical of market-centred economies, compared to earth-centred economies, which she 
holds are infinitely better at ‘providing better human sustenance for all.’ Yet, PPSS and its 
members depend on national and state-level markets in petty commodities for their survival, 
and intend to continue to do so.  
 
The district of Jagatsinghpur hosts a highly productive and relatively (by rural Indian 
standards) lucrative agricultural economy. The majority of villagers cultivate a range of crops 
including betel,viiipaddy, cashew and other tree species, as well as collecting minor forest 
products such as bamboo and fuel (Pingle et al., 2010, p.19), while some engage in fishing, 
operate shrimp farms (pisciculture) or practice animal husbandry (IHRC and ESCR-Net, 
2013, pp.12-13). Of these livelihood activities, betel cultivation and trading is the most 
lucrative, earning an average annual profit of about Rs. 200,000 [U.S. $ 3374] in 2010 for the 
owner (IHRC and ESCR-Net, 2013: 12), and providing additional employment for landless 
labourers (Asher, 2009, p.12). In addition to the income stream provided by cultivation of 
betel, shrimp or cashews, families in the affected villages in Jagatsinghpur also supplement 
their livelihood in significant ways by accessing common resources, including rice, fish and 
forest products that are gathered locally and used for household consumption (MZPSG, 2010, 
pp.37-38). Furthermore, these livelihoods engage all members of the family in productive 
work (MZPSG, 2010, p.35). In a context of deteriorating agricultural production and 
associated impoverishment and marginalization of rural populations in Odisha, this 
successful agricultural way of life is significant (cf. Mishra, 2011). 
 
As such, PPSS members are very committed to retaining these livelihood sources. The vision 
articulated in our interviews with PPSS members, and in PPSS communications with 
supporters (sent out via email regularly), is one of a light industrial form of capitalism that 
supports small scale petty commodity production and trade. The emphasis is on livelihoods 
that are both sustainable, in terms of protecting natural resources for the long-term future, and 
dignified, in terms of enabling people some autonomy, financial security and a reasonable 
standard of living. To support these aspirations, villagers want the state to provide 
infrastructure, such as roads and small-scale processing factories for commodities like 
cashews. In this sense, they want to benefit from modern technologies, not to return any kind 
of idealised pre-technological era, as post-developmentalists can sometimes demand (see also 
Nanda 1999). However, they see technology as playing a complementary role in the 
preservation of livelihood and natural resources. Far from constituting Rahnema’s vernacular 
society in which ‘abundance is perceived as a state of nature’ (2010, p.187), villagers are, in 
fact, worried about the security of their natural resources, and actively seek to protect them, 
but in order that they might be exploited over the long-term, in a sustainable way. The effort 
here is, then, to push the state to become a sustainably developmental state.  
 
In addition to this commitment to small-scale petty commodity production and trade, 
supported by the state, there is some ambivalence around wage labour among PPSS members 
that also complicates the post-development paradigm. Though there is some willingness 
among men to become proletarianized or semi-proletarianised by accepting wage labouring 
positions in nearby heavy industry, this is generally only understood as acceptable as a 
supplement to secure land rights and ongoing production of betel and so on. PPSS members 
do not want to sacrifice their own land and resources, but are willing to benefit from the 
employment opportunities offered by heavy industrialisation in other areas. Women are much 
less enthusiastic about a move to wage labouring, understandably given the very few 
employment opportunities for women in heavy industry. Equally, many people who either 
were landless to begin with, or have become landless through forcible land acquisition, are 
dalit or low-caste people. They find themselves in a particularly precarious position, making 
a living by wage labouring on other people’s land, and willing to take wage labour positions 
in factories, but ultimately still desiring land or land restitution as their first priority. 
 
One of the reasons for the ambivalence around wage labour and the staunch commitment to 
land-based livelihoods is the villagers’ witnessing of the experience of a nearby village with 
heavy industrialisation – the Indian Oil refinery. PPSS members have seen the plight of 5000 
displaced villagers of Trilochanpur (part of Dhinkia Panchayat but not in the proposed 
POSCO area) who gave their land to Indian Oil corporation limited in the 1990s,but did not 
get ongoing employment in the factory built there. In 2017, affected villagers – neighours of 
PPSS members – organised under the banner of JamiharaKrushak Ekta Manch( Solidarity 
platform of families who lost land to Indian Oil) and launched an indefinite hunger strike 
demanding permanent jobs, and more adequate compensation and rehabilitation for their 
earlier displacement. This case, and many others like it in the state, have demonstrated that 
the promise of a position in the proletariat is often a false one, and that displaced people are 
far more likely to be surplus to labour demands, and to fall into a vicious cycle of 
impoverishment and social dysfunction. Individual villagers’ interest in becoming a wage 
labourer is, then, contingent upon their degree of optimism regarding opportunity, and their 
assessment of their other livelihood options, particularly for women (who have few wage 
opportunities) and the landless (who are more in need of income than those with land).  
 
Concluding reflections 
One of the long-standing critiques of post-development scholarship is that is has an 
inconsistent theory of power(Lehmann 1997, p.573; Ziai 2004, p.1047). On the one hand, 
post-developmentalists (especially the early ones) paint a picture of a developmental power 
so ubiquitous it is inescapable, and yet on the other they glorify autonomous and untainted 
people’s movements that have somehow escaped development’s reach to imagine and pursue 
alternative life projects. Our research with PPSS shows that neither extreme is the case. In 
practice, the power of the conventional development imaginary is significant and has shaped 
the aspirations of members of the people’s movement, but not so much that they have come 
to resemble only homo oeconomici desiring nothing but a western way of life. Desires for 
improvement are a negotiation on a messy terrain of power’s effects.  
 
The case of the anti-POSCO people’s movement is inspiring in many ways. Their resilience 
in the face of more than a decade of violence and hostility from government and the private 
sector, in order to protect a dignified and sustainable way of life is remarkable. However, the 
movement does not align neatly with all that the post-development literature proposes as core 
to post-development. It is our contention that this does not simply mean the movement has 
been co-opted by the development machine, but that the pluriversality the movement aims at 
is more subtle in nature. We don’t want to imply some kind of pure and autochthonous 
emergence of untainted ideas and desires, but nor do we wish to imply false consciousness. 
What this research shows instead is a thick social, economic and political fabric in which a 
plurality of desires exist in conversation with each-other. 
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i Naveen Pattnaik is son of Biju Pattnaik, the founding father of the state of Odisha. Pattnaik and his party, BJD, 
were in an alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from 1998 until 2009, after which time BJD was able 
to gain a majority in the Legislative Assembly alone. BJD’s platform is one of neoliberal economic policy and 
industrialization. The party’s success is often attributed to the lack of a strong opposition, as neither BJP nor 
Congress are strong at state level. BJD is not, however, popular in tribal areas or areas where there are peoples’ 
movements. 
ii 80% of mining leases in the state since liberalization have been for private companies (Adduci 2012, p.79). 
iiiZiai is referring to states as in nation-states, though the same principle applies when considering comparison of 
states within India. 
iv This is particularly so in the case of POSCO, where its use of technology was one of the major justifications 
for seeking foreign rather than domestic investment.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
v CPI and other opposition parties also had clear electoral interests in joining and leading these movements. 
viAn additional piece of important legislation for decentralised democratic decision making is The Panchayat 
(Extension to Scheduled Areas) (PESA) Act 1996, which extended Part IX of the Constitution, constituting the 
panchayat system, to Scheduled areas. The Fifth Schedule deals with administration of scheduled areas where 
tribal communities are in a majority. The PESA Act aims to empower the Panchayati Raj Institutions in the 
Scheduled areas for economic development and social justice. Under this Act, a Gram Sabha has the power to 
safeguard and preserve the traditions and customs of the people of the area, their cultural identity, community 
resources and customary dispute resolution processes. However, Jagatsinghpur was not a Scheduled Area so this 
legislation is less directly relevant to PPSS, but important in empowering other anti-corporate and anti-
displacement people’s movements in the state. 
vii In addition, the term ‘self-determination’ has connotations of state secession in India that are not relevant 
here.  
viiiPaan is a mix of betel leaves and other ingredients that is consumed widely in Asia.  
